RETRACTED: “A Probability Model of Covering Key Trace during Capturing Volatile Memory” Procedia Engineering Volume 29, 2012, Pages 1253–1258  by Wang, Lianhai et al.
Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 1253 – 1258
1877-7058 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2012.01.122
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
          Procedia Engineering  00 (2011) 000–000 
Procedia
Engineering
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
2012 International Workshop on Information and Electronics Engineering (IWIEE) 
A Probability Model of Covering Key Trace during Capturing 
Volatile Memory 
Lianhai Wang,  Hengjian Li∗, Zhen Su 
Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Computer Network, Shandong Computer Science Center, jinan, 250014,China 
Abstract 
In this paper, we give a clear description of the running memory acquiring tool on a target system, especially for 
possibility covering the key trace during capturing volatile memory. Some key trace of offender may still in the 
running memory after the scene of a crime and have critical role in court and security applications. However, some 
key trace, such as rootkits in the memory, memory occupied by their corresponding process will probably be covered/ 
reallocated during the procedure of obtaining evidence of the crime. Therefore, the covered ratio (lost data) should be 
evaluated and investigated after the forensic tools run. Firstly, we model the distribution of key trace exacted in the 
unallocated memory space, then form a formula to evaluate the coverage rate of the key trace in which the 
corresponding process has just been killed. At last, we give some cases to analyze the evidence coverage ratio which 
can be estimated by the new allocated memory space. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
Keywords: Computer forensics; key trace; memory capturing; Microsoft Windows XP SP2 
1. Introduction 
Physical memory forensics has gained a lot of attention over the past years[1], and various methods 
have been investigated for capturing and examining the volatile storage of a target machine. Memory 
analysis has proven its efficacy during incident response and more traditional forensic investigations. And, 
we can extract useful information from the physical memory, such as extracting the content of windows 
clipboard from physical memory[2], command lines in the DOSKEY[3] and registry information [4,5]. 
There are two existed memory acquired methods, one is based on hardware, and the other is based on 
software[1]. The hardware method needs installing the related device before, which is not useful in the 
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real cases. Therefore, the software-based acquired memory tools are actually employed in digital 
investigation. However, when running the software-based acquired memory tools, uploading the related 
driver files would probability alter the content of target memory. 
On one hand, the volatility memory changes as the OS is running in a natural way. On the other hand, 
the memory content is varied by the uploading drivers when capturing the target machine memory. 
During a live forensics-investigation one rule of best practice is to minimize the impact on the target 
system, and it is an unavoidable action. And this leads to the trustable of acquired memory, that is, 
whether the evidence information is changed or covered because of running a memory acquired process. 
At present, the main research in memory forensics is how to extract information from memory as much as 
possible, such as network connection state, registry and login password. However, the effect of memory 
captured tool on the system has not well been investigated yet. In [6], Aaron Waters discuss the content of 
memory changes over time. On the basis of a comprehensive summarizing and reviewing of existing 
results, Wang proposed a novel Model of Computer Live Forensics [7], and firstly took the credibility of 
digital evidence as a starting point, the issue of credibility of live forensic is then put forward for study. 
Memory analysis is a key element of digital forensics. Leveraging memory to determine the state of 
the machine at the time of the incident is often critical to success. While there has been significant 
research into memory forensics, to date there has not been research into covering the key trace during 
capturing memory. The memory content of a process is not lost immediately when the process is killed. 
The acquired memory tool may cover or disturb this part of memory. In this paper, we estimate the cover 
possibility for the loading acquired tool. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the memory 
management process and give an overview of the most important data structures that are required for this 
task. Modeling the Covering key trace of evidence is proposed in section 3. And the probability 
computation algorithm of covering on key trace memory zone is also described in detail in this section. 
Experimental results and analysis is presented in section 4. We conclude with a summary of our work and 
indicate opportunities for future research in this area in Section 5. 
2. Process and virtual address to physical address in memory 
Based on Kernel Processor Control Region(KPCR),Zhang propose an effective process analysis 
method which uses a combination of scanning and list traversing techniques[8]. Brendan Dolan-Gavitt 
proposed that the Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) tree, can provide such an abstraction layer over the 
page directory and page tables by describing the memory ranges allocated by a process as they might be 
seen by the process – as mapped files, loaded DLLs, or privately allocated regions[9]. VADs are data 
structures linked to each process’ EPROCESS block that the memory manager uses to keep track of 
which virtual addresses have been reserved for each process. Programs usually operate on virtual memory 
regions only, therefore, to manipulate the respective physical data, the Memory Manager must 
continuously translate (map) virtual into physical addresses[10]. 
This virtual into physical addresses procedure works as follows: At the hardware level, volatile 
storage is organized into units called pages. A common size of such pages is 4kB on x86-platform. To 
reference a page, the operating system implements a two-level approach: For every process, the operating 
system maintains a page directory that saves pointers (Page Directory Entries PDEs 4 bytes each, 
containing a pointer and several flags) to 1024 links (Page Table Entries, 4 bytes each) to the 
corresponding page in the main memory. Thus, in order to translate a virtual to a physical address, the 
memory manager first needs to recover the base address of the page directory. It is stored in the CR3 
registry of the processor and is reloaded from the _KPROCESS block of the process at every context 
switch. The first 10 bits of the virtual address can then be used as an index into the page directory to 
retrieve the desired PDE. With the help of the PDE and the page table index, i.e, the subsequent 10 bits of 
the virtual address, the page table and PTE in question are identified in the next step. To find the 
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approximate page and data in RAM eventually, the PTE and the 12-bit byte index of the virtual address 
are parsed. 
The Virtual Address Descriptor tree is used by the Windows memory manager to describe memory 
ranges used by a process as they are allocated. When a process allocates memory with VirutalAlloc, the 
memory manager creates an entry in the VAD tree. A node in the tree is associated with a pool tag and is 
of type _MMVD_SHORT(“VadS”), _MMVAD(“Vad”), or _MMVAD_LONG(“VadL”). The latter two 
store a pointer to a _Control_Area structure that, in turn, points to a _File_Object that holds the unique 
file name. Consequently, the entire list of loaded modules can be retrieved by traversing the VAD tree 
from top to bottom and following the corresponding _Control_Area and _File_Object references.  
3. Model and Evaluation the Covering key trace of evidence  
3.1. Model and Evaluation the influence of the key trace caused by acquiring memory tools 
When performing memory analysis, there are two primary components: a) kernel memory and 
b)userland memory. In a Windows environment, kernel memory is comprised primarily of device drivers, 
the NT operating system executable, and HAL.DLL. The majority of userland memory is compromised of 
individual process, and the process’ address primarily consists of files loaded from disk that contain code 
or data needed for process execution, typically Portable Executables (EXEs) and Dynamic Link 
Libraries(DLLs). Most of the virtual address in kernel memory is global regardless of the process context, 
whereas the other virtual address space is generally specific to each particular process.  
 Fig.1 Effect on the target system memory while running acquiring tool 
Techniques used in live forensics will inevitably change the system under investigation because 
they must be conducted by running tools on the system. And as such any findings may be problematic as 
evidence at court. Effects of live forensics to collected evidence included the probability of covering key 
trace by forensic tool kit and affecting region in digital evidence. As showed in Fig.1, with the running 
acquiring tools, some of the unallocated memory will be allocated for the new process. And, some 
memory data may be transferred into the pagefile.sys.  
Walking the VAD tree is simply a matter of identifying the _EPROCESS structure for the process of 
interest, locating the VadRoot member (0x11c in all versions of XP), and then following each link to the 
left and right subtrees until the entire tree is traversed. All addresses are virtual, so the page directory for 
the process is also needed in order to successfully read the tree. For affecting region, it can be obtained by 
finding physical memory occupied by forensic tool through its VadRoot. The probability of covering key 
trace can be calculated by probability statistics, which can be inferred in the following section as follows. 
(1) Supposed the key traces distributed uniformly in the unallocated memory pages. The number of 
the unallocated memory page is m, and the symbol of these pages noted as 1 2{ , , , }m mB B BΩ = ⋅⋅ ⋅ 。
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(2) The pages of the unallocated memory increased as running the forensic tools. After the memory 
acquired tool, supposed the number of novel unallocated page is n (of course, n<m). We noted these 
pages as 1 2{ , , , }n nB B B′ ′ ′Ω = ⋅⋅ ⋅  ( n mΩ ⊂ Ω ). Then, we can simply treat the  r m nΩ = Ω −Ω  as the 
forensics tools occupied pages. And we noted the number of the containing the key traces memory pages 
as e, of course e rΩ ⊆ Ω .
(3) Suppose the event xA′ = “the key trace contained in rΩ ”. Therefore, it can be inferred as      
( )x
e
P A
m n
′ = − .This formulation approximate the key trace probability of the arbitrarily memory pages 
contained in nΩ . That is,  
( ) ( )x x
e
P A P A
e m n
′= = + −                                                                (1) 
(4)The probability of covering the key traces in unallocated memory can be computed as：
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3.2. The flow char of the computing the key trace covering probability  
Virtual address physical address size,    Virtual address   physical address size 
        
Fig.2 A part of memory map of the process “hedef100.exe” and “user_load.exe” 
The VAD tree describes memory ranges is used by a process and enables reconstruction of a 
process virtual address space. A node in this tree can have a number of different pool tags, depending on 
the type of Virtual Address Descriptor. Common tags are VadS, Vad and VadL. The latter two objects 
contain pointers to Control Areas, which are described below. This object contains, among other things, 
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the file size of the mapped file. Fig. 2 illustrates the virtual address, physical address and the page size. In 
each process, An essential part of the operating system on the suspect machine and distinguishing 
legitimate components from suspicious and potentially malicious applications. 
Fig.3 The flow char of the computing the key trace covering probability 
During the process, we employ volatility framework 2.0 to analyze the memory[12]. Fig.3 illustrates 
the flow chart of the computing the key trace covering probability. Firstly, we capture the whole memory 
of the target system. Later, we search the rootkit process, and find the Pid. According to the pid, we find 
out the virtual address using VAD tools. Then, we translate the virtual address into physical address and 
record them. At last, we compare the physical address employed in the rootkit with that of employed in 
the memory acquired tool. In the real running system, there are some rootkits, such as hxdef100.exe. 
Usually, we kill the process using icesword tool, and capture the system memory once again. 
4. Experiments and results
In order to make clear which part of memory content has been changed during the evidence acquired 
process. And which part of memory content would be covered because of loading the memory acquired 
tool, we make some experiments using the following Environment. The experiments are performed 
using a Windows XP Service Pack 2 VMware® Workstation 7.1.4 build-385536 on a Windows 7 host. 
The host OS is Windows 7 Ultimate, 32-bit (Build 7600) 6.1.7600, with 3G RAM. The live response 
toolkit used in our experiments is the user_load.exe, which is developed by ourselves and based on the 
absolute driver file (MemDump.sys). 
The comparing files function of the WinHex is using to analysis the impact on progress and drive of 
the key traces, by comparing the front and back memory image files of running forensics tools. A txt file 
will be generated if they are different. In this trial no difference was found, so forensics tools have no 
effect on the progress and drive the Hacker Defender(hxdef100.exe). 
The size of the Hxdef100.exe occupied 292KB on disk. However, the pages of hxdef100.exe 
occupied 136 in memory.  Running x nt! Mmavailablepages command using Windbg to find the basic 
addresses of the unallocated memory pages, moreover operating MemoryAnalyzer to obtain the offset 
address. Finally, get the physical address of the undistributed memory pages by adding the above two 
addresses. We make different experiments using different rootkits, such as hack defender. Running 
rookits also needs some shared Dlls, and this Dlls memory is shared. Here, we only consider the part 
of .exe memory. 
Tab.1 the probability of covering key trace 
e m n m-n P(Ai)Hxdef100.exe 
136 0x015ad2(88786) 0x0159ef(88559) 227 0.5991 
                 
Before acquiring the system memory, the unallocated pages are 88786, and after acquiring the 
memory, the unallocated pages are 88559. Therefore, the new allocated memory page is 88786-
88559=227. The pages of the Hxdef100 process occupied 136. In theory, the probability of covering key 
trace is 0.5991. From formula (3) in section 3.2, we can compute the covering probability 1-(1-
0.5991)^136  is nearly to 1. That is, the integrity of the process hxdef100.exe is destroyed.  
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From the process physical memory, about 49 in 134 pages are the same, that is, 49 pages are reused in 
the process of the memory acquired tool. It can be noted that the hxdef100.exe contains 136pages, but 
134 pages can be located in the physical memory. The results of Tab.1 show that part of the key trace is 
covered by loading the memory acquired tool. That is, the integrality of the original data using in the 
malware possibility in the memory can be destroyed. Some of physical memory employed in the original 
process may be allocated for running the new process. 
5. Conclusions and future work 
When the process has just been killed, not all the physical memory related the process would   be 
allocated for other process. In this paper, we analyze the allocated physical memory of the key trace. 
Then, we kill the process and count the covering pages. Considering the relation between usage rate of 
memory and model of the key trace, we computed the covering probability in the captured memory. Some 
of the data in process can not be very important in court. Therefore, we need further to investigate that the 
key data in the process would be covered or not in detail. In the future work, we will solve this problem. 
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